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Abstract
A lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with state information available
causally at both the encoder and decoder is established. The lower bound is shown to be strictly larger
than that for the noncausal case by Liu and Chen. Achievability is proved using block Markov coding,
Shannon strategy, and key generation from common state information. The state sequence available at
the end of each block is used to generate a key, which is used to enhance the transmission rate of the
confidential message in the following block. An upper bound on the secrecy capacity when the state is
available noncausally at the encoder and decoder is established and is shown to coincide with the lower
bound for several classes of wiretap channels with state.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the 2-receiver wiretap channel with state depicted in Figure 1. The sender X wishes to send
a message to the legitimate receiver Y while keeping it asymptotically secret from the eavesdropper
Z . The secrecy capacity for this channel can be defined under various scenarios of state information
availability at the encoder and decoder. When the state information is not available at either party, the
problem reduces to the classical wiretap channel for the channel averaged over the state and the secrecy
capacity is known [1], [2]. When the state is available only at the decoder, the problem reduces to the
wiretap channel with augmented receiver (Y, S).
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Fig. 1: Wiretap channel with State
The interesting scenarios to consider therefore are when the state information is available at the encoder
and may or may not be available at the decoder. This raises the question of how the encoder and decoder
can make use of the state information to increase the secrecy rate. In [3], Chen and Vinck established
a lower bound on the secrecy capacity when the state information is available noncausally only at the
encoder. The lower bound is established using a combination of Gelfand–Pinsker coding and Wyner
wiretap coding. Subsequently, Liu and Chen [4] used the same techniques to establish a lower bound on
the secrecy capacity when the state information is available noncausally at both the encoder and decoder.
In a related direction, Khisti, Diggavi, and Wornell [5] considered the problem of secret key agreement
first studied in [6] and [7] for the wiretap channel with state and established the secret key capacity when
the state is available causally or noncausally at the encoder and decoder. The key is generated in two
parts; the first using a wiretap channel code while treating the state sequence as a time-sharing sequence,
and the second part is generated from the state itself.
In this paper, we consider the wiretap channel with state information available causally at the encoder
and decoder. We show that the lower bound for the noncausal case in [4] is achievable when only causal
state information is available. Our achievability scheme, however, is quite different from that for the
noncausal case. We use block Markov coding, Shannon strategy for channels with state [8], and secret
key agreement from state information, which builds on the work in [5]. However, unlike [5], we are not
directly interested in the size of the secret key, but rather in using the secret key generated from the
state sequence in one transmission block to increase the secrecy rate in the following block. This block
Markov scheme causes additional information leakage through the correlation between the secret key
generated in a block and the received sequences at the eavesdropper in subsequent blocks. Although a
similar block Markov coding scheme was used in [9] to establish the secrecy capacity of the degraded
wiretap channel with rate limited secure feedback, in their setup no information about the key is leaked
to the eavesdropper because the feedback link is assumed to be secure.
We also establish an upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with state information
available noncausally at the encoder and decoder. We show that the upper bound coincides with the
aforementioned lower bound for several classes of channels. Thus, the secrecy capacity for these classes
does not depend on whether the state information is known causally or noncausally at the encoder.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide the needed definitions. In
Section III, we summarize and discuss the main results in the paper. The proofs of the lower and upper
bounds are detailed in Sections IV and V, respectively.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Consider a discrete memoryless wiretap channel (DM-WTC) with discrete memoryless state (DM)
(X × S, p(y, z|x, s)p(s),Y,Z) consisting of a finite input alphabet X , finite output alphabets Y , Z , a
finite state alphabet S , a collection of conditional pmfs p(y, z|x, s) on Y×Z , and a pmf p(s) on the state
alphabet S . The sender X wishes to send a confidential message M ∈ [1 : 2nR] to the receiver Y while
keeping it secret from the eavesdropper Z with either causal or noncausal state information available at
both the encoder and decoder.
A (2nR, n) code for the DM-WTC with causal state information at the encoder and decoder consists
of: (i) a message set [1 : 2nR], (ii) an encoder that generates a symbol Xi(m) according to a conditional
pmf p(xi|m, si, xi−1) for i ∈ [1 : n]; and a decoder that assigns an estimate Mˆ or an error message to
each received sequence pair (yn, sn). We assume throughout that the message M is uniformly distributed
over the message set. The probability of error is defined as P (n)e = P{Mˆ 6= M}. The information leakage
rate at the eavesdropper Z , which measures the amount of information about M that leaks out to the
eavesdropper, is defined as RL = 1nI(M ;Z
n). A secrecy rate R is said to be achievable if there exists a
sequence of codes with P (n)e → 0 and RL → 0 as n→∞. The secrecy capacity CS−CSI is the supremum
of the set of achievable rates.
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We also consider the case when the state information is available noncausally at the encoder. The
only change in the above definitions is that the encoder now generates a codeword Xn(m) according
to the conditional pmf p(xn|m, sn), i.e., the stochastic mapping is allowed to depend on the entire state
sequence instead of just the past and present state sequence. The secrecy capacity for this scenario is
denoted by CS−NCSI.
The notation used in this paper will follow that of El Gamal–Kim Lectures on Network Information
Theory [10].
III. SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS
We summarize the results in this paper. Proofs are given in the following two sections and in the
Appendix.
Lower Bound
The main result in this paper is the following lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the DM-WTC
with causal state information available causally at both the encoder and decoder.
Theorem 1: The secrecy capacity of the DM-WTC with state information available causally at the
encoder and decoder is lower bounded as
CS−CSI ≥ max{ max
p(v|s)p(x|v,s)
min{I(V ;Y |S)− I(V ;Z|S) +H(S|Z), I(V ;Y |S)},
max
p(v)p(x|v,s)
min{H(S|Z, V ), I(V ;Y |S)}
}
. (1)
Note that if S = ∅, the above lower bound reduces to the secrecy capacity for the wiretap channel. Define
RS−CSI−1 = max
p(v|s)p(x|v,s)
min{I(V ;Y |S)− I(V ;Z|S) +H(S|Z), I(V ;Y |S)},
RS−CSI−2 = max
p(v)p(x|v,s)
min{H(S|Z, V ), I(V ;Y |S)}.
Then, (1) can be expressed as
CS−CSI ≥ max{RS−CSI−1, RS−CSI−2}.
The proof of this theorem is detailed in Section IV.
In [4], the authors established the following lower bound for the noncausal case
CS−NCSI ≥ max
p(u|s)p(x|u,s)
(I(U ;Y, S) −max{I(U ;Z), I(U ;S)})
= max
p(u|s)p(x|u,s)
min {I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S) + I(S;U |Z), I(U ;Y |S)} . (2)
Clearly, RS−CSI−1 is at least as large as this lower bound. Hence, our lower bound (1) is at least as large
as this lower bound (2). We now show that the lower bound (2) is as large as RS−CSI−1.
Fix V ∈ [0 : |V|− 1], p(v|s), and p(x|v, s) in RS−CSI−1. Let U ∈ [0 : |V||S|− 1] in bound (2). Define
the conditional probability mass functions: For u = v + s|V|, let p(u|s) = p(v|s), p(x|u, s) = p(x|v, s),
and let p(u|s) = p(x|u, s) = 0 otherwise. Under this mapping, it is easy to see that H(S|Z,U) = 0 and
the other terms in (2) reduce to those in RS−CSI−1.
We now show that our lower bound (1) can be strictly larger than that for the noncausal case (2)).
This is done via an example for which RS−CSI−2 > RS−CSI−1.
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Fig. 2: Example
Consider the channel in Figure 2, where X ,Y,Z,S ∈ {0, 1} and p(y, z|x, s) = p(y, z|x) with channel
transition probabilities as defined in the Figure. The state S is an i.i.d process that is observed by X and
Y with H(S) = 1−H(0.1).
By setting V = X independent of S and P{X = 1} = P{X = 0} = 0.5 in RS−CSI−2, we obtain
RS−CSI−2 = 1−H(0.1).
We now show that RS−CSI−1 is strictly smaller than 1−H(0.1). First, note that
I(V ;Y |S) = H(Y |S)−H(Y |V, S)
≤ H(Y )−H(Y |X)
= I(X;Y ) ≤ 1−H(0.1).
However, for RS−CSI−1 ≥ 1 −H(0.1), we must have I(V ;Y |S) ≥ 1 −H(0.1). Hence, we must have
I(V ;Y |S) = 1−H(0.1). Next, consider
I(V ;Y |S) = H(Y |S)−H(Y |V, S)
(a)
≤ 1−H(Y |V, S)
(b)
≤ 1−H(Y |V, S,X)
= 1−H(0.1)
Step (a) holds with equality iff p(y|s) = 0.5 for all y, s ∈ {0, 1}. From the structure of the channel,
this implies that p(x|s) = 0.5 for all x, s ∈ {0, 1}. Step (b) holds with equality iff H(Y |X,V, S) =
H(Y |V, S), or equivalently I(X;Y |V, S) = 0. This implies that given V, S, X and Y are independent,
p(x, y|v, s) = p(x|v, s)p(y|v, s). But since p(x, y|v, s) = p(x|v, s)p(y|x), either (i) p(x|v, s) = 0 or (ii)
p(y|v, s) = p(y|x) must hold. Now, consider the pair x = 1, y = 1. Then, we must have either (i)
p(x = 1|v, s) = 0 or (ii) p(y = 1|v, s) = p(y = 1|x = 1) = 0.9. In (i), X is a function of V and S. In
(ii), we have
p(y = 1|v, s) = p(x = 1|v, s)p(y = 1|x = 1) + (1− p(x = 1|v, s))p(y = 1|x = 0)
= 0.9p(x = 1|v, s) + 0.1 − 0.1p(x = 1|v, s)
= 0.8p(x = 1|v, s) + 0.1.
Using the fact that p(y = 1|v, s) = 0.9, we have 0.8p(x = 1|v, s) + 0.1 = 0.9 ⇒ p(x = 1|v, s) = 1.
This implies again that X is a function of V, S. In both cases (i) and (ii), we see that X is necessarily
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a function of V and S, which implies that Z = X is also a function of V and S. Using the fact that
p(x|s) = p(z|s) = 0.5 for all x, s, we have
I(V ;Z|S) = H(Z|S)−H(Z|V, S) = H(X|S) = 1.
The first expression in RS−CSI−1 is then upper bounded by
I(V ;Y |S)− I(V ;Z|S) +H(S|Z) ≤ I(V ;Y |S)− I(V ;Z|S) +H(S)
= 1−H(0.1) − 1 + 1−H(0.1)
= 1− 2H(0.1) < 1−H(0.1).
This shows that RS−CSI−1 < RS−CSI−2, which completes the example.
To illustrate the main ideas of the achievability proof of Theorem 1, we provide an outline for part
of the proof of the rate expression RS−CSI−1. Using the functional representation lemma [11], we can
show that it suffices to perform the maximization in RS−CSI−1 over p(u), p(x|v, s), and functions v(u, s).
Thus, we prove achievability for the equivalent characterization of RS−CSI−1
RS−CSI−1 ≥ max
p(u),v(u,s),p(x|v,s)
min{I(U ;Y, S) − I(U ;Z,S) +H(S|Z), I(U ;Y, S)}. (3)
We will outline the proof for the case where I(U ;Y, S) − I(U ;Z,S) > 0. Our coding scheme involves
the transmission of b− 1 independent messages over b n-transmission blocks. We split the message Mj ,
j ∈ [2 : b], into two independent messages Mj0 ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ] and Mj1 ∈ [1 : 2nR1 ], where R0 +R1 = R.
The codebook generation consists of two steps. The first step is the generation of the message codebook.
We randomly generate 2nI(U ;Y,S) un(l) sequences and partition them into 2nR0 equal size bins. The
codewords in each bin are further partitioned into 2nR1 equal size sub-bins C(m0,m1). The second step
is to generate the key codebook. We randomly bin the set of state sequences sn into 2nRK bins B(k).
The key Kj−1 used in block j is the bin index of the state sequence S(j − 1) in block j − 1.
To send message Mj , Mj1 is encrypted with the key Kj−1 to obtain the index M ′j1 = Mj1 ⊕Kj−1.
A codeword un(L) is selected uniformly at random from sub-bin C(Mj0,Mj1 ⊕Kj−1) and transmitted
using Shannon’s strategy as depicted in Figure 3. The decoder uses joint typicality decoding together
with its knowledge of the key to decode message Mj at the end of block j. Finally, at the end of block
j, the encoder and decoder declare the bin index Kj of the state sequence s(j) as the key to be used in
block j+1. To show that the messages can be kept asymptotically secret from the eavesdropper, note that
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Mj0 is transmitted using Wyner wiretap coding. Hence, it can be kept secret from eavesdropper provided
I(U ;Y, S) − I(U ;Z,S) > 0. The key part of the proof is to show that the second part of the message
Mj1, which is encrypted with the key Kj−1, can be kept secret from the eavesdropper. This involves
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showing that the eavesdropper has negligible information about Kj−1. However, the fact that Kj−1 is
generated from the state sequence in block j − 1 and used in block j results in correlation between it
and all received sequences at the eavesdropper from subsequent blocks. We show that the eavesdropper
has negligible information about Kj−1 given all its received sequences provided RK < H(S|Z).
Upper Bound
We establish the following upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with noncausal
state information available at both the encoder and decoder (which holds also for the causal case).
Theorem 2: The following is an upper bound to the secrecy capacity of the DM-WTC with state
noncausally available at the encoder and decoder
CS−NCSI ≤ min {I(V1;Y |U,S)− I(V1;Z|U,S) +H(S|Z,U), I(V2;Y |S)} .
for some U, V1 and V2 such that p(u, v1, v2, x|s) = p(u|s)p(v1|u, s)p(v2|v1, s)p(x|v2, s).
The proof of this theorem is given in Section V.
Secrecy Capacity Results
1. Following the lines of [3], we can show that Theorems 1 and 2 are tight for the following two special
cases.
(i) If there exists a V ∗ such that maxp(v|s)p(x|v,s)(I(V ;Y |S)− I(V ;Z|S) +H(S|Z)) = I(V ∗;Y |S)−
I(V ∗;Z|S) + H(S|Z) and I(V ∗;Y |S) − I(V ∗;Z|S) + H(S|Z) ≤ I(V ∗;Y |S), then the secrecy
capacity is CS−CSI = CS−NCSI = I(V ∗;Y |S)− I(V ∗;Z|S) +H(S|Z).
(ii) If there exists a V ′ such that maxp(v|s)p(x|v,s) I(V ;Y |S) = I(V ′;Y |S) and I(V ′;Y |S) ≤ I(V ′;Y |S)−
I(V ′;Z|S) +H(S|Z), then the secrecy capacity is CS−CSI = CS−NCSI = I(V ′;Y |S).
2. We show that Theorems 1 and 2 are also tight when I(U ;Y |S) ≥ I(U ;Z|S) for U such that (U,S)→
(X,S) → (Y,Z) form a Markov chain, i.e., when Y is less noisy than Z for every state s ∈ S [12].
Theorem 3: The secrecy capacity for the DM-WTC with the state information available causally or
noncausally at the encoder and decoder when Y is less noisy than Z is
CS−CSI = CS−NCSI = max
p(x|s)
min{I(X;Y |S)− I(X;Z|S) +H(S|Z), I(X;Y |S)}.
Consider the special case when p(y, z|x, s) = p(y, z|x) and Z is a degraded version of Y , then Theorem 3
specializes to the secrecy capacity for the wiretap channel with a key [13]
CS−CSI = CS−NCSI
= max
p(x)
min{I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) +H(S), I(X;Y )}.
Achievability for Theorem 3 follows directly from Theorem 1 by setting V = X and observing that
the expression reduces to RS−CSI−1 since Y is less noisy than Z . To establish the converse, we use the
less noisy assumption to strengthen the first inequality in Theorem 2 as follows
I(V1;Y |U,S)− I(V1;Z|U,S) +H(S|Z,U) ≤ I(V1;Y |U,S)− I(V1;Z|U,S) +H(S|Z)
(a)
≤ I(V1;Y |S)− I(V1;Z|S) +H(S|Z)
(b)
≤ I(X;Y |S)− I(X;Z|S) +H(S|Z),
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where (a), (b) follow from the less noisy assumption. The proof of the second inequality follows by the
data processing inequality: I(V2;Y |S) ≤ I(X;Y |S).
3. Next, consider the case where p(y, z|x, s) = p(y, z|x) and the eavesdropper Z is less noisy [12] than
Y. That is, I(U ;Z) ≥ I(U ;Y ) for every U such that U → X → (Y,Z). Then, the capacity of this
special class of channels is
CS−CSI = CS−NCSI = max
p(x)
min{H(S), I(X;Y )}.
Achievability follows by setting V = X independent of S. The converse follows from Theorem 2 and
the observation that since Z is less noisy than Y and p(y, z|x, s) = p(y, z|x),
I(V1;Y |U,S)− I(V1;Z|U,S) +H(S|Z,U) ≤ H(S|Z,U)
≤ H(S),
and I(V2;Y |S) ≤ I(X;Y ).
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We will prove the achievability of RS−CSI−1 and RS−CSI−2 separately. For RS−CSI−1, we will prove
the equivalent expression stated in equation 3.
The proof of achievability for RS−CSI−1 is split into two cases (Cases 1 and 2) while RS−CSI−2 is
proved in Case 3.
Case 1: RS−CSI−1 with I(U ;Y, S) > I(U ;Z,S)
Codebook generation: Split message Mj into two independent messages Mj0 ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ] and Mj1 ∈
[1 : 2nR1 ], thus R = R0 +R1. Let R˜ ≥ R. The codebook generation consists of two steps.
Message codeword generation: We randomly and independently generate 2nR˜ sequences un(l), l ∈ [1 :
2nR˜], each according to
∏n
i=1 p(ui) and partition them into 2nR0 equal-size bins C(m0), m0 ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ].
We further partition the sequences within each bin C(m0) into 2nRK equal size sub-bins, C(m0,m1),
m1 ∈ [1 : 2
nR1 ].
Key codebook generation: We randomly and uniformly partition the set of sn sequences into 2nRK
bins B(k), k ∈ [1 : 2nRK ].
Both codebooks are revealed to all parties.
Encoding: We send b − 1 messages over b n-transmission blocks. In the first block, we randomly
select a sequence un(L) ∈ C(m10,m′11). The encoder then computes vi = v(ui(L), si) and transmits a
randomly generated symbol Xi ∼ p(xi|si, vi) for i ∈ [1 : n]. At the end of the first block, the encoder
and decoder declare k1 ∈ [1 : 2nRK ] such that s(1) ∈ B(k1) as the key to be used in block 2.
Encoding in block j ∈ [2 : b] proceeds as follows. To send message mj = (mj0,mj1) and given key
kj−1, the encoder computes m′j1 = mj1 ⊕ kj−1. To ensure secrecy, we must have R1 ≤ RK [14]. The
encoder then randomly selects a sequence un(L) ∈ C(mj0,m′j1). It then computes vi = v(ui(L), si) and
transmits a randomly generated symbol Xi ∼ p(xi|si, vi) for i ∈ [(j − 1)n + 1 : jn].
Decoding and analysis of the probability of error: At the end of block j, the decoder declares that
lˆ is sent if it is the unique index such that (un(lˆ),Y(j),S(j)) ∈ T (n)ǫ , otherwise it declares an error. It
then finds the indices (mˆj0, mˆ′j1) such that un(l) ∈ C(mˆj0, mˆ′j1). Finally, it recovers mˆj1 by computing
mˆj1 = mˆ
′
j1 ⊕ kj−1.
7
To analyze the probability of error, let ǫ′′ > ǫ′ > ǫ > 0 and define the following events for every
j ∈ [2 : b]:
E(j) = {Mˆj 6= Mj},
E1(j) = {(U
n(L),S(j)) /∈ T nǫ′ },
E2(j) = {(U
n(L),S(j),Y(j)) /∈ T nǫ′′},
E3(j) = {(U
n(lˆ),S(j),Y(j)) ∈ T nǫ′′ for some lˆ 6= L}.
The probability of error is upper bounded as
P(E) = P{∪bj=2E(j)} ≤
b∑
j=2
P(E(j)).
Each probability of error term can be upper bounded as
P(E(j)) ≤ P(E1(j)) + P(E2(j) ∩ E
c
1(j)) + P(E3(j) ∩ E
c
2(j)).
Now, P(E1(j)) → 0 as n → ∞ by Law of Large Numbers (LLN) since P{(Un(L) ∈ T (n)ǫ )} → 1 as
n → ∞ and S(j) ∼
∏n
i=1 p(si) =
∏n
i=1 p(si|ui) by independence. The term P(E2(j) ∩ Ec1(j)) → 0 as
n→∞ by LLN since (Un(L),S(j) ∈ T ne′ and Y n ∼
∏n
i=1 p(yi|ui, si). For the last term, consider
P(E3 ∩ E
c
2(j)) ≤
∑
l
p(l)
∑
lˆ6=l
P{(Un(lˆ),S(j),Y(j)) ∈ T nǫ′′ |E
c
2(j), L = l}
(a)
≤
∑
lˆ6=l
2−n(I(U ;Y,S)−δ(ǫ
′′)) ≤ 2n(R˜−I(U ;Y,S)+δ(ǫ
′′)),
where (a) follows from: (i) L is independent of the transmission codebook sequences Un and the current
state sequence S(j); and (ii) the conditional joint typicality lemma [10, Lecture 2]. Hence, P(E3∩Ec2(j)) →
0 as n→∞ if R˜ < I(U ;Y, S) − δ(ǫ′′).
Analysis of the information leakage rate: We use Zj to denote the eavesdropper’s received sequence
from blocks 1 to j and Z(j) to denote the received sequence in block j. We will need the following two
results.
Proposition 1: If RK < H(S|Z) − 4δ(ǫ) and R˜ ≥ I(U ;Z,S), then the following holds for every
j ∈ [1 : b].
1) H(Kj |C) ≥ n(RK − δ(ǫ)).
2) I(Kj ;Z(j)|C) ≤ 2nδ(ǫ).
3) I(Kj ;Zj |C) ≤ nδ′(ǫ), where δ(ǫ) → 0 and δ′(ǫ)→ 0 as ǫ→ 0.
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix I.
Lemma 1: [15] Let (U, V, Z) ∼ p(u, v, z), R¯ ≥ 0 and ǫ > 0. Let Un be a random sequence
distributed according to
∏n
i=1 p(ui). Let V n(l), l ∈ [1 : 2nR¯], be a set of random sequences that are
conditionally independent given Un and each distributed according to
∏n
i=1 p(vi|ui). Let L be a random
index with an arbitrary distribution over [1 : 2nR¯] independent of (Un, V n(l)), l ∈ [1 : 2nR¯]. Then, if
P{(Un, V n(L), Zn) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ } → 1 as n → ∞ and R¯ ≥ I(V ;Z|U), there exists a δ(ǫ) > 0, where
δ(ǫ) → 0 as ǫ→ 0, such that H(L|Zn, Un) ≤ n(R¯− I(V ;Z|U)) + nδ(ǫ).
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We are now ready to upper bound the leakage rate averaged over codes. Consider
I(M2,M3, . . . ,Mb;Z
b|C) =
b∑
j=2
I(Mj ;Z
b|C,M bj+1)
(a)
≤
b∑
j=2
I(Mj ;Z
b|C,S(j),M bj+1)
(b)
=
b∑
j=2
I(Mj ;Z
j |C,S(j)),
where (a) follows by the independence of Mj and (S(j),M bj+1), and (b) follows by the Markov Chain
relation (Zbj+1,M bj+1, C) → (Zj ,S(j), C) → (Mj , C). Hence, it suffices to upper bound each individual
term I(Mj ;Zj|C,S(j)). Consider
I(Mj ;Z
j |C,S(j)) = I(Mj0,Mj1;Z
j |C,S(j))
= I(Mj0,Mj1;Z
j−1|C,S(j)) + I(Mj0,Mj1;Z(j)|C,S(j),Z
j−1).
Note that the first term is equal to zero by the independence of Mj and past transmissions, the codebook,
and state sequence. For the second term, we have
I(Mj0,Mj1;Z(j)|C,S(j),Z
j−1) = I(Mj0;Z(j)|C,S(j),Z
j−1) + I(Mj1;Z(j)|C,Mj0,S(j),Z
j−1).
We now bound the each term separately. Consider the first term
I(Mj0;Z(j)|C,S(j),Z
j−1) = I(Mj0, L;Z(j)|C,S(j),Z
j−1)− I(L;Z(j)|C,Mj0,S(j),Z
j−1)
≤ I(Un;Z(j)|C,S(j),Zj−1)−H(L|C,Mj0,S(j),Z
j−1)
+H(L|Z(j),Mj0,S(j))
≤
n∑
i=1
(H(Zi(j)|C,Si(j))−H(Zi(j)|C, Ui,Si(j)))
−H(L|C,Mj0,S(j),Z
j−1) +H(L|Z(j),Mj0,S(j))
(a)
≤ nI(U ;Z|S)−H(L|C,Mj0,S(j),Z
j−1) +H(L|Z(j),Mj0,S(j))
(b)
≤ nI(U ;Z|S)−H(L|C,Mj0,S(j),Z
j−1)
+ n(R˜−R0 − I(U ;Z,S) + δ(ǫ))
(c)
= n(R˜−R0)−H(L|C,Mj0,S(j),Z
j−1) + nδ(ǫ)
= n(R˜−R0)−H(Mj1 ⊕Kj−1|C,Mj0,S(j),Z
j−1)
−H(L|C,Mj0,S(j),Z
j−1,Mj1 ⊕Kj−1) + nδ(ǫ)
≤ n(R˜−R0)−H(Mj1 ⊕Kj−1|C,Mj0,S(j),Kj−1,Z
j−1)
− n(R˜−R0 −RK) + nδ(ǫ)
(d)
= nRK −H(Mj1 ⊕Kj−1|C,Mj0,S(j),Kj−1) + nδ(ǫ)
= nRK −H(Mj1|C,Mj0,S(j),Kj−1) + nδ(ǫ) = nδ(ǫ),
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where (a) follows from the fact that H(Zi(j)|C,Si(j)) ≤ H(Zi(j)|Si(j)) = H(Z|S) and H(Zi(j)|C, Ui,Si(j)) =
H(Z|U,S). Step (b) follows by Lemma 1 which requires that (i) P{(Un(L),S(j),Z(j)) ∈ T (n)ǫ } → 1
as n→∞, and (ii) R˜−R0 ≥ I(U ;Z,S); where (i) can be shown using the same steps as in the analysis
of probability of error. Step (c) follows by the independence of U and S. Step (d) follows from the
Markov Chain relation (Zj−1,Mj0,S(j)) → (Kj−1,Mj0,S(j)) → (Mj1 ⊕ Kj−1,Mj0,S(j)). The last
step follows by the fact that Mj1 is independent of (C,Mj0,S(j),Kj−1) and uniformly distributed over
[1 : 2nRK ].
Next, consider the second term
I(Mj1;Z(j)|C,Mj0,S(j),Z
j−1) ≤ I(Mj1, L;Z(j)|C,Mj0,S(j),Z
j−1)
− I(L;Z(j)|C,Mj0,Mj1,S(j),Z
j−1)
≤ I(Un;Z(j)|C,Mj0,S(j),Z
j−1)−H(L|C,Mj0,Mj1,S(j),Z
j−1)
+H(L|C,Mj0,Mj1,S(j),Z
j)
(a)
≤ nI(U ;Z|S)−H(L|C,Mj0,Mj1,S(j),Z
j−1)
+H(L|C,Mj0,Mj1,S(j),Z
j)
≤ nI(U ;Z|S)−H(L|C,Mj0,Mj1,S(j),Z
j−1) +H(L|Mj0,S(j),Z(j))
(b)
≤ nI(U ;Z|S)−H(L|C,Mj0,Mj1,S(j),Z
j−1)
+ n(R˜−R0)− nI(U ;Z,S) + nδ(ǫ)
= n(R˜−R0)−H(L|C,Mj0,Mj1,S(j),Z
j−1) + nδ(ǫ),
where (a) follows from the same steps used in bounding I(Mj0;Z(j)|C,S(j),Zj−1); (b) follows from
Lemma 1. Next consider
H(L|C,Mj0,Mj1,S(j),Z
j−1) = H(Mj1 ⊕Kj−1|C,Mj0,Mj1,S(j),Z
j−1)
+H(L|C,Mj0,Mj1,Mj1 ⊕Kj−1,S(j),Z
j−1)
= H(Kj−1|C,Mj0,Mj1,S(j),Z
j−1) + n(R˜−R0 −RK)
= H(Kj−1|C,Z
j−1) + n(R˜−R0 −RK).
From Proposition 1, H(Kj−1|C,Zj−1) ≥ n(RK − δ(ǫ) − δ′(ǫ)), which implies that
I(Mj1;Z(j)|C,Mj0,S(j),Z
j−1) ≤ n(δ′(ǫ) + 2δ(ǫ)).
This completes the analysis of information leakage rate.
Rate analysis: From the analysis of probability of error and information leakage rate, we see that the
rate constraints are
R˜ < I(U ;Y, S) − δ(ǫ),
R˜−R0 ≥ I(U ;Z,S),
RK < H(S|Z)− 4δ(ǫ),
R0 +R1 ≤ R˜,
R1 ≤ RK ,
R = R0 +R1.
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Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination (see for e.g. Lecture 6 of [10]), we obtain
R < max
p(u),v(u,s),x(u,s)
min{I(U ;Y, S) − I(U ;Z,S) +H(S|Z), I(U ;Y, S)}
(a)
= max
p(u),v(u,s),p(x|s,v)
min{I(V ;Y |S)− I(V ;Z|S) +H(S|Z), I(V ;Y |S)},
where (a) follows by the independence of U and S and the fact that V is a function of U and S.
Case 2: RS−CSI−1 with I(U ;Y, S) ≤ I(U ;Z,S)
Under this condition, the decoder cannot rely on the wiretap channel to send a confidential message.
Therefore, only the key is used to encrypt the message and transmit it securely. Note that we only need
to consider the case where H(S|Z)− (I(U ;Z,S) − I(U ;Y, S)) > 0.
Codebook generation: Codebook generation again consists of two steps.
Message codebook generation: Let R˜ ≥ Rd and R ≤ R˜− Rd. Randomly and independently generate
2nR˜ sequences un(l), l ∈ [1 : 2nR˜], each according to
∏n
i=1 p(ui) and partition them into 2nRd equal-size
bins C(md), md ∈ [1 : 2nRd ]. We further partition the set of sequences in each bin C(md) into sub-bins,
C(md,m), m ∈ [1 : 2
nR].
Key codebook generation: We randomly bin the set of sn ∈ Sn sequences into 2nRK bins B(k),
k ∈ [1 : 2nRK ].
Encoding: We send b−1 messages over b n-transmission blocks. In the first block, we randomly select
a un(L) sequence. The encoder then computes vi = v(ui(L), si), i ∈ [1 : n], and transmits a randomly
generates sequence Xn according to
∏n
i=1 p(xi|si, vi). At the end of the first block, the encoder and
decoder declare k1 ∈ [1 : 2nRK ] such that s(1) ∈ B(k1) as the key to be used in block 2.
Encoding in block j ∈ [2 : b] is as follows. We split the key kj−1 into two independent parts, Kj−1,d and
Kj−1,m at rates Rd and R, respectively. To send message mj , the encoder computes m′ = mj⊕k(j−1)m.
This requires that RK ≥ R+Rd. The encoder then randomly selects a sequence un(L) ∈ C(k(j−1)d,m′).
At time i ∈ [(j − 1)n + 1 : jn], it computes vi = v(ui(L), si), and transmits a randomly generated
symbol Xi according to p(xi|si, vi).
Decoding and analysis of the probability of error: At the end of block j, the decoder declares that lˆ
is sent if it is the unique index such that (un(lˆ),Y(j),S(j)) ∈ T (n)ǫ and un(lˆ) ∈ C(k(j−1)d). Otherwise,
it declares an error. It then finds the index mˆ′ such that un(lˆ) ∈ C(k(j−1)d, mˆ′). Finally, it recovers mˆj
by computing mˆj = mˆ′ ⊕ k(j−1)m. Following similar steps to the analysis for Case 1, it can be shown
that Pe → 0 as n→∞ if R˜−Rd < I(U ;Y, S)− δ(ǫ).
Analysis of the information leakage rate: Following the same steps as for Case 1, we can show that
it suffices to upper bound the terms I(Mj ;Z(j)|C,S(j),Zj−1) for j ∈ [2 : b]. Consider
I(Mj ;Z(j)|C,S(j),Z
j−1) = H(Mj)−H(Mj |C,S(j),Z
j)
≤ H(Mj)−H(Mj |C,S(j),K(j−1)d ,Mj ⊕K(j−1)m,Z
j)
= H(Mj)−H(Mj |C,K(j−1)d,Mj ⊕K(j−1)m,Z
j−1)
= H(Mj)−H(Mj |C,Z
j−1,K(j−1)d)−H(Mj ⊕K(j−1)m|C,Z
j−1,K(j−1)d,Mj)
+H(Mj ⊕K(j−1)m|C,Z
j−1,K(j−1)d)
= nR−H(Mj) +H(Mj ⊕K(j−1)m|C,Z
j−1,K(j−1)d)
−H(Mj ⊕K(j−1)m|C,Z
j−1,K(j−1)d,Mj)
≤ nR−H(K(j−1)m|C,Z
j−1,K(j−1)d).
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Thus, showing that
I(K(j−1)m;Z
j−1|C,K(j−1)d) ≤ nδ
′(ǫ), (4)
H(K(j−1)m|C,K(j−1)d) ≥ n(RK −Rd − δ(ǫ)) (5)
implies
I(Mj ;Z(j)|C,S(j),Z
j−1) ≤ nR− n(RK −Rd) + n(δ
′(ǫ) + δ(ǫ)).
Hence, the rate of information leakage approaches zero as n→∞ if R ≤ RK−Rd. To prove (4) and (5),
we need the following Proposition.
Proposition 2: If R˜ ≥ I(U ;Z,S) and RK < H(S|Z)− 4δ(ǫ), then for all j ∈ [1 : b],
1) H(Kj |C) ≥ n(RK − δ(ǫ)).
2) I(Kj ;Z(j)|C) ≤ 3nδ(ǫ).
3) I(Kj ;Zj |C) ≤ nδ′(ǫ), where δ(ǫ) → 0 and δ′(ǫ)→ 0 as ǫ→ 0.
The proof of this Proposition is given in Appendix II.
Part 3 of Proposition 2 implies (4), since
I(Kj−1;Z
j−1|C) = I(K(j−1)d,K(j−1)m;Z
j−1|C)
= I(K(j−1)d;Z
j−1|C) + I(K(j−1)m;Z
j−1|C,K(j−1)d).
Part 1 of Proposition 2 implies (5), since H(K(j−1)|C) = H(K(j−1)m,K(j−1)d|C) ≥ n(RK − δ(ǫ)),
which implies that H(K(j−1)m|C,K(j−1)d) ≥ n(RK −Rd − δ(ǫ)).
Rate analysis: The following rate constraints are necessary for Case 2.
R˜ ≥ I(U ;Z,S),
R˜−Rd < I(U ;Y, S) − δ(ǫ),
R ≤ R˜−Rd,
RK < H(S|Z)− 4δ(ǫ),
R ≤ RK −Rd.
Using Fourier Motzkin elimination, we obtain
R < max
p(u),v(u,s)
min{I(U ;Y, S) − I(U ;Z,S) +H(S|Z), I(U ;Y, S)}
= max
p(u),v(u,s),p(x|s,v)
min{I(V ;Y |S)− I(V ;Z|S) +H(S|Z), I(V ;Y |S)}.
Case 3: RS−CSI−2
For RS−CSI−2, the key generated in a block is used purely to encrypt the message in the following block.
This implies that there is a possibility that the eavesdropper can decode the codeword transmitted in the
current block, which reduces the key rate that can be generated at the current block. This is compensated
for by the fact that the entire key is used for message transmission. The codebook generation, encoding
and analysis of probability of error and equivocation are therefore similar to that in Case 2.
Codebook generation: Codebook generation again consists of two steps.
Message codebook generation: Randomly and independently generate 2nR sequences vn(l), l ∈ [1 :
2nR], each according to
∏n
i=1 p(vi).
Key codebook generation: Set RK = R. We randomly bin the set of sn ∈ Sn sequences into 2nRK
bins B(k), k ∈ [1 : 2nRK ].
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Encoding: We send b − 1 messages over b n-transmission blocks. In the first block, we randomly
select a vn(L) sequence. The encoder then transmits a randomly generated sequence Xn according to∏n
i=1 p(xi|si, vi). At the end of the first block, the encoder and decoder declare k1 ∈ [1 : 2nRK ] such
that s(1) ∈ B(k1) as the key to be used in block 2.
Encoding in block j ∈ [2 : b] is as follows. To send message mj , the encoder computes m′ = mj⊕kj−1.
The encoder then selects the sequence vn(m′). At time i ∈ [(j − 1)n + 1 : jn], it transmits a randomly
generated symbol Xi according to p(xi|si, vi).
Decoding and analysis of the probability of error: At the end of block j, the decoder declares that mˆ′
is sent if it is the unique index such that (vn(mˆ′),Y(j),S(j)) ∈ T (n)ǫ . Otherwise, it declares an error. It
then recovers mˆj by computing mˆj = mˆ′ ⊕ kj−1. Following similar steps to the analysis for Case 1, it
can be shown that Pe → 0 as n→∞ if R < I(V ;Y, S)− δ(ǫ).
Analysis of the information leakage rate: Following the same steps as for Case 1, we can show that
it suffices to upper bound the terms I(Mj ;Z(j)|C,S(j),Zj−1) for j ∈ [2 : b]. Consider
I(Mj ;Z(j)|C,S(j),Z
j−1) = H(Mj)−H(Mj |C,S(j),Z
j)
≤ H(Mj)−H(Mj |C,S(j),Mj ⊕Kj−1,Z
j)
= H(Mj)−H(Mj |C,Mj ⊕Kj−1,Z
j−1)
= H(Mj)−H(Mj ⊕Kj−1,Mj |C,Z
j−1) +H(Mj ⊕Kj−1|C,Z
j−1)
≤ nR−H(Mj |C,Z
j−1)−H(Mj ⊕Kj−1|C,Z
j−1,Mj) + nR
= nR−H(Kj−1|C,Z
j−1).
Thus, showing that
I(Kj−1;Z
j−1|C) ≤ nδ′(ǫ), (6)
H(Kj−1|C) ≥ n(RK − δ(ǫ)) (7)
implies
I(Mj ;Z(j)|C,S(j),Z
j−1) ≤ n(δ′(ǫ) + δ(ǫ)).
To prove (6) and (7), we will use the following Proposition
Proposition 3: If RK < H(S|Z, V )− 4δ(ǫ), then for all j ∈ [1 : b],
1) H(Kj |C) ≥ n(RK − δ(ǫ)).
2) I(Kj ;Z(j)|C) ≤ 3nδ(ǫ).
3) I(Kj ;Zj |C) ≤ nδ′(ǫ), where δ(ǫ) → 0 and δ′(ǫ)→ 0 as ǫ→ 0.
The proof of this Proposition is given in Appendix III. It is clear that equations (6) and (7) are implied
by Proposition 3, which completes the analysis of information leakage rate.
Rate analysis: The following rate constraints are necessary for Case 3.
R = RK ,
R < I(V ;Y, S)− δ(ǫ),
RK < H(S|Z, V )− 4δ(ǫ).
These constraints imply the achievability of
R < max
p(v)p(x|s,v)
min{H(S|Z, V ), I(V ;Y |S)}.
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V. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For any sequence of codes with probability of error and leakage rate that approach zero as n → ∞,
consider
nR = H(M)
(a)
≤ I(M ;Y n, Sn) + nǫn
(b)
≤ I(M ;Y n, Sn)− I(M ;Zn) + 2nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
(I(M ;Yi, Si|Y
n
i+1, S
n
i+1)− I(M ;Zi|Z
i−1)) + 2nǫn
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
(I(M,Zi−1;Yi, Si|Y
n
i+1, S
n
i+1)− I(M,Y
n
i+1, S
n
i+1;Zi|Z
i−1)) + 2nǫn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
(I(M ;Yi, Si|Y
n
i+1, S
n
i+1, Z
i−1)− I(M ;Zi|Y
n
i+1, S
n
i+1, Z
i−1)) + 2nǫn
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
(I(V1i;Yi, Si|Ui)− I(V1i;Zi|Ui)) + 2nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
(I(V1i;Yi, Si|Ui)− I(V1i;Zi, Si|Ui) + I(V1i;Si|Zi, Ui)) + 2nǫn
≤
n∑
i=1
(I(V1i;Yi, Si|Ui)− I(V1i;Zi, Si|Ui) +H(Si|Zi, Ui)) + 2nǫn
≤
n∑
i=1
(I(V1i;Yi|Ui, Si)− I(V1i;Zi, Si|Ui, Si) +H(Si|Zi, Ui)) + 2nǫn
(f)
= n(I(V1;Y |U,S)− I(V1;Z|U,S) +H(S|Z,U)) + 2nǫn,
where (a) follows by Fano’s inequality; (b) follows from the secrecy condition; (c) and (d) follows the
Csisza´r sum identity; (e) follows from defining Ui = (Y ni+1, Sni+1, Zi−1) and V1i = (M,Y ni+1, Sni+1, Zi−1);
and (f) follows from setting Q to be a uniform random variable over [1 : n], independent of all other
variables, and defining U = (UQ, Q), V1 = (V1Q, Q), S = SQ, Y = YQ and Z = ZQ.
For the second upper bound, we have
nR ≤ I(M ;Y n, Sn) + nǫn
(a)
= I(M ;Y n|Sn) + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
I(M ;Yi|S
n, Y ni+1)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M,Y ni+1, Z
i−1, Sni+1, S
i−1;Yi|Si)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(V2i;Yi|Si)
= nI(V2Q;Y |S,Q)
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(c)
≤ nI(V2;Y |S),
where (a) follows from the independence between M and Sn; (b) follows from defining
V2i = (M,Y
n
i+1, Z
i−1, Sni+1, S
i−1) and (c) follows from defining V2 = (V2Q, Q).
VI. CONCLUSION
We established bounds on the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with state information causally
available at the encoder and decoder. We showed that our lower bound can be strictly larger than the
best known lower bound for the noncausal state information case. The upper bound holds when the state
information is available noncausally at the encoder and decoder. We showed that the bounds are tight for
several classes of wiretap channels.
We used key generation from state information to improve the message transmission rate. It may be
possible to extend this idea to the case when state information is available only at the encoder. This case,
however, is not straightforward to analyze since it would be necessary for the encoder to reveal some
state information to the decoder (and hence partially to the eavesdropper) in order to agree on a secret
key. This may reduce the wiretap coding part of the rate.
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APPENDIX I
APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
1. The proof of this result follows largely from Lemma 2 in Lecture 23 of Lectures on Network
Information Theory by El Gamal and Kim [10]. For completeness, we give the proof here. Consider
H(Kj |C) ≥ P{S
n ∈ T (n)ǫ }H(Kj |C,S(j) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ )
≥ (1− ǫ′n)H(Kj |C,S(j) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ ).
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Let P (kj) be the random pmf of Kj given {S(j) ∈ T (n)ǫ }, where the randomness is induced by the
random bin assignment (codebook) C.
By symmetry, P (kj), kj ∈ [1 : 2nRK ], are identically distributed. We express P (1) in terms of a
weighted sum of indicator functions as
P (1) =
∑
sn∈T
(n)
ǫ
p(sn)
P{Sn ∈ T
(n)
ǫ }
· I{sn∈B(1)}.
It can be easily shown that
EC(P (1)) = 2
−nRK ,
Var(P (1)) = 2−nRK (1− 2−nRK )
∑
xn∈T (n)ǫ
(
p(sn)
P{S(j) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ }
)2
≤ 2−nRK2n(H(S)+δ(ǫ))
2−2n(H(S)−δ(ǫ))
(1− ǫ′n)
2
≤ 2−n(RK+H(S)−4δ(ǫ))
for sufficiently large n.
By the Chebyshev inequality,
P{|P (1) − E(P (1))| ≥ ǫE(P (1))} ≤
Var(P (1))
(ǫE(P (1)))2
≤
2−n(H(S)−RK−4δ(ǫ))
ǫ2
.
Note that if RK < H(S)− 4δ(ǫ), this probability → 0 as n→∞. Now, by symmetry
H(K1|C,S(j) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ )
= 2nRK E(P (1)) log(1/P (1)))
≥ 2nRK P{|P (1) − E(P (1))| < ǫ2−nRK}E
(
P (1) log(1/P (1))
∣∣ |P (1)− E(P (1))| < ǫ2−nRK)
≥
(
1−
2−n(H(S)−RK−4δ(ǫ))
ǫ2
)
· (nRK(1− ǫ)− (1− ǫ) log(1 + ǫ))
≥ n(RK − δ(ǫ))
for sufficiently large n and RK < H(S)− 4δ(ǫ).
Thus, we have shown that if RK < H(S)− 4δ(ǫ), H(Kj |C) ≥ n(RK − δ(ǫ)) for n sufficiently large.
This completes the proof of part 1 of Proposition 1. Note now that since H(S|Z) ≤ H(S), the same
results also holds if RK ≤ H(S|Z)− 4δ(ǫ).
2. We need to show that if RK < H(S|Z)− 3δ(ǫ), then I(Kj ;Z(j)|C) ≤ 2nδ(ǫ) for every j ∈ [1 : b].
We have
I(Kj ;Z(j)|C) = I(S(j);Z(j)|C) − I(S(j);Z(j)|Kj , C).
16
We analyze the terms separately. For the first term, we have
I(S(j);Z(j)|C) = I(S(j), L;Z(j)|C) − I(L;Z(j)|S(j), C)
≤ I(Un,S(j);Z|C) −H(L|S(j), C) +H(L|S(j), Zn)
≤ nI(U,S;Z)−H(L|S(j), C) +H(L|S(j), Zn)
(a)
≤ nI(U,S;Z)−H(L|S(j), C) + n(R˜− I(U ;Z,S) + δ(ǫ))
= nR˜−H(Mj0|C)−H(Mj1 ⊕Kj−1|C,Mj0)
−H(L|Mj0,Mj1 ⊕Kj−1, C) + nI(S;Z) + nδ(ǫ)
≤ nR˜− nR0 −H(Mj1 ⊕Kj−1|C,Mj0,Kj−1)− n(R˜−R0 −RK) + nI(S;Z) + nδ(ǫ)
= nRK −H(Mj1|C,Mj0,Kj−1) + nI(S;Z) + nδ(ǫ)
= n(I(S;Z) + δ(ǫ)),
where step (a) follows from application of Lemma 1 which holds since R˜ − R0 ≥ I(U ;Z,S). For the
second term we have
I(S(j);Z(j)|Kj , C) = H(S(j)|Kj , C)−H(S(j)|Z(j),Kj , C)
= H(S(j),Kj |C)−H(Kj |C)−H(S(j)|Z(j),Kj , C)
≥ nH(S)− nRK −H(S(j)|Z(j),Kj , C)
≥ n(H(S)−RK)−H(S(j)|Z(j),Kj )
(b)
≥ n(H(S)−RK)− n(H(S|Z)−RK + δ
′(ǫ))
= nI(S;Z)− nδ(ǫ),
where (b) follows from showing that H(S(j)|Z(j),Kj ) ≤ n(H(S|Z) − RK + δ(ǫ)). This requires the
condition RK < H(S|Z) − 3δ(ǫ). Combining the bounds for the 2 expressions gives I(Kj ;Z(j)|C) ≤
2nδ(ǫ).
Proof of step (b): Give an arbitrary ordering to the set of all state sequences sn with S(j) = sn(T ) for
some T ∈ [1 : 2n log |S|]. Hence, H(S(j)|Z(j),K) = H(T |K,Z(j)).
From the coding scheme, we know that P{(sn(T ),Z(j)) ∈ T (n)ǫ } → 1 as n → ∞. Note here that T
is random and corresponds to the realization of Sn.
Now, fix T = t, Z(j) = zn, K = k and define N(zn, k, t) := |l˜ ∈ [1 : |T (n)ǫ (S)|] : (sn(l˜), zn) ∈
T
(n)
ǫ , l˜ 6= t, sn(l˜) ∈ B(k)|. For zn /∈ T (n)ǫ , N(zn, k, t) = 0. For zn ∈ T (n)ǫ , it is easy to show that
|T
(n)
ǫ (S|Z)| − 1
2nRK
≤ E(N(zn, k, t)) ≤
|T
(n)
ǫ (S|Z)|
2nRK
,
Var(N(zn, k, t)) ≤
|T
(n)
ǫ (S|Z)|
2nRK
.
By the Chebyshev inequality,
P{N(zn, k, t) ≥ (1 + ǫ) E(N(zn, k, t))} ≤
Var(N(zn, k, t))
(ǫE(N(zn, k, t)))2
≤
2−n(H(S|Z)−3δ(ǫ)−RK )
ǫ2
.
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Note that P{N(zn, k, t) ≥ (1 + ǫ) E(N(zn, k, t))} → 0 as n→∞ if R < H(S|Z)− 3δ(ǫ). Now, define
the following events
E1 := {(S(j),Z(j)) /∈ T
(n)
ǫ },
E2 := {N(Z(j),K, T ) ≥ (1 + ǫ) E(N(Z(j),K, T ))}.
Let E = 0 if Ec1 ∩ Ec2 occurs and 1 otherwise. We have
P(E = 1) ≤ P(E1) + P(E2)
≤ P(E1) +
∑
(zn,sn(t))∈T (n)ǫ , k
p(zn, t, k) P{N(zn, k, t) ≥ (1 + ǫ) E(N(zn, k, t))}
+ P{(sn(T ),Z(j)) /∈ T (n)ǫ }.
P{(sn(T ),Z(j)) /∈ T
(n)
ǫ } = P(E1) and P(E1)→ 0 as n→∞ by the coding scheme. For the second term,
P{N(zn, k, t) ≥ (1+ ǫ) E(N(zn, k, t))} → 0 as n→∞ if R < H(S|Z)−3δ(ǫ). Hence, P(E = 1)→ 0
as n→∞ if if R < H(S|Z)− 3δ(ǫ).
We can now bound H(T |K,Zn) by
H(T |K,Zn) ≤ 1 + P(E = 1)H(T |K,Zn, E = 1) +H(T |K,Zn, E = 0)
≤ n(H(S|Z)−RK + δ(ǫ)).
3. To upper bound I(Kj ;Zj |C), we use an induction argument assuming that I(Kj−1;Zj−1|C) ≤
nδj−1(ǫ), where δj−1(ǫ)→ 0 as ǫ→ 0. Note that the proof for j = 2 follows from part 2. Consider
I(Kj ;Z
j|C) = I(Kj ;Z(j)|C) + I(Kj ;Z
j−1|C,Z(j))
(a)
≤ 2nδ(ǫ) + I(Kj ;Z
j−1|C,Z(j))
= H(Zj−1|C,Z(j)) −H(Zj−1|C,Z(j),Kj) + 2nδ(ǫ)
≤ H(Zj−1|C)−H(Zj−1|C,Kj−1,Z(j),Kj) + 2nδ(ǫ)
(b)
= H(Zj−1|C)−H(Zj−1|C,Kj−1) + 2nδ(ǫ)
= I(Kj−1;Z
j−1|C) + 2nδ(ǫ)
(c)
≤ nδj−1(ǫ) + 2nδ(ǫ),
where (a) follows from part 2 of the Proposition; (b) follows from the Markov Chain relation Zj−1 →
Kj−1 → (Z(j),Kj); (c) follows from the induction hypothesis. This completes the proof since the last
line implies that there exists a δ′(ǫ), where δ′(ǫ) → 0 as ǫ → 0, that upper bounds I(Kj ;Zj |C) for
j ∈ [1 : b].
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
1. We first show that if RK < H(S) − 4δ(ǫ), then H(Kj |C) ≥ n(RK − δ(ǫ)). This is done in the
same manner as 1 of Proposition 1. The proof is therefore omitted.
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2. We need to show that if RK < H(S|Z)− 3δ(ǫ), then I(Kj ;Z(j)|C) ≤ 2nδ(ǫ) for every j ∈ [1 : b].
We have
I(Kj ;Z(j)|C) = I(S(j);Z(j)|C) − I(S(j);Z(j)|Kj , C).
We analyze the terms separately. For the first term, we have
I(S(j);Z(j)|C) = I(S(j), L;Z(j)|C) − I(L;Z(j)|S(j), C)
≤ I(Un,S(j);Z|C) −H(L|S(j), C) +H(L|S(j), Zn)
≤ nI(U,S;Z)−H(L|S(j), C) +H(L|S(j), Zn)
(a)
≤ nI(U,S;Z)−H(L|C) + n(R˜− I(U ;Z,S) + δ(ǫ))
= nR˜−H(K(j−1)d|C)−H(K(j−1)m ⊕Mj |C) + nI(S;Z)
−H(L|K(j−1)m ⊕Mj ,K(j−1)d) + nδ(ǫ)
(b)
≤ n(R˜−Rd −R− R˜+Rd +R+ 2δ(ǫ)) + nI(S;Z)
= n(I(S;Z) + 2δ(ǫ)),
where step (a) follows from application of Lemma 1, which holds from the condition that R˜ ≥ I(U ;Z,S),
and the fact that S(j) is independent of L. Step (b) follows from part 1 of Proposition 2: H(Kj−1|C) ≥
n(RK−δ(ǫ)), which implies that H(K(j−1)d|C) ≥ n(Rd−δ(ǫ)). Note we implicitly assumed j ≥ 2. The
case of j = 1 is straightforward, since H(L|C) = nR˜ by the fact that we transmit a codeword picked
uniformly at random.
The proof that I(S(j);Z(j)|Kj , C) ≥ nI(S;Z)− nδ(ǫ) follows the same steps as the proof of part 2
of Proposition 1 and requires the same condition that RK < H(S|Z)− 3δ(ǫ).
3. Part 3 of the Proposition is proved in the same manner as part 3 of Proposition 1.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
1. We first show that if RK < H(S) − 4δ(ǫ), then H(Kj |C) ≥ n(RK − δ(ǫ)). This is done in the
same manner as 1 of Proposition 1. The proof is therefore omitted.
2. We need to show that if RK < H(S|Z, V )−3δ(ǫ), then I(Kj ;Z(j)|C) ≤ nδ(ǫ) for every j ∈ [1 : b].
We have
I(Kj ;Z(j)|C) ≤ I(Kj ;Z(j), U
n|C)
= I(S(j);Z(j), Un|C)− I(S(j);Z(j), Un |Kj , C).
We analyze the terms separately. For the first term, we have
I(S(j);Z(j), V n|C) = I(S(j);Z(j)|V n, C)
=
n∑
i=1
(H(Zi(j)|C, V
n,Zi−1(j)) −H(Zi(j)|C, V
n,S(j),Zi−1(j)))
≤
n∑
i=1
(H(Zi(j)|C, Vi)−H(Zi(j)|C, Vi,Si(j)))
≤ n(H(Z|V )−H(Z|V, S))
= nI(Z;S|V ) = nI(Z, V ;S).
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For the second term, we have
I(S(j);Z(j), V n|Kj , C) = H(S(j)|Kj , C)−H(S(j)|Z(j), V
n,Kj , C)
= H(S(j),Kj |C)−H(Kj |C)−H(S(j)|Z(j), V
n,Kj , C)
≥ nH(S)− nRK −H(S(j)|Z(j), V
n,Kj , C)
≥ n(H(S)−RK)−H(S(j)|Z(j), V
n,Kj)
(b)
≥ n(H(S)−RK)− n(H(S|Z, V )−RK + δ
′(ǫ))
= nI(S;Z, V )− nδ(ǫ),
The proof of step (b) follows the same steps as in the proof of part 2 of Proposition 1. We can show
that step (b) holds if RK < H(S|Z, V )− 3δ(ǫ).
Combining the two terms then give the required upper bound which completes the proof of Part 2.
3. Part 3 of the Proposition is proved in the same manner as part 3 of Proposition 1.
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